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INTRODUCTION 
Most death row inmates today face execution by lethal injection through 
a series of compounded lethal drugs. However, this lethal injection method 
has only become standard practice within the last decade.1 Traditionally, state 
correctional facilities conducted executions using manufactured drugs, which 
national pharmaceutical companies produced at industry-grade standards. 
Starting in 2010, states began running out of manufactured drugs when 
pharmaceutical companies placed distribution restrictions on such drugs to 
ensure that states could not obtain the drugs for use in lethal injections.2 
Furthermore, a court order eﬀectively blocked foreign imports of a 
misbranded drug that several state correctional departments had turned to 
for lethal injections.3 This drug shortage crisis caused states to settle for a 
solution that would allow lethal injection to continue uninterrupted: sourcing 
drugs from local compounders.4 
Compounded lethal drugs are mixed by individuals at local shops according 
to their own specifications and are widely regarded to be less safe than 
manufactured drugs.5 These drugs receive little government oversight in their 
production. Although the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has statutory 
authority to regulate compounded lethal drugs, it has consistently refused to do 
so.6 Instead, the federal government has mostly left regulation of compounders 
to the states.7 Despite being responsible for licensing and overseeing 
 
1 For an overview of lethal injection’s origins and development, see Deborah W. Denno, The 
Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 
64-77 (2007). 
2 German Lopez, How a Shortage of Lethal Injection Drugs Put the Death Penalty Before the Supreme 
Court, VOX (June 29, 2015), https://www.vox.com/2015/3/27/8301357/death-penalty-lethal-injection 
[https://perma.cc/5RL5-CY95]. 
3 See Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
4 See Ross Levitt & Deborah Feyerick, Death Penalty States Scramble for Lethal Injection Drugs, CNN 
(Nov. 16, 2013), https://www-m.cnn.com/2013/11/15/justice/states-lethal-injection-drugs [https://perma.cc/
78YG-YRG2] (describing how states were resorting to procedures never before used in execution history 
such as trying new drug combinations or going to compounding pharmacies). 
5 See Compounding Pharmacies, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, https://deathpenalty
info.org/compounding-pharmacies [https://perma.cc/G5DW-CBQR] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019) 
(discussing the dangers associated with compounding pharmacies and lethal injection). 
6 See, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellants at 19, Cook, 733 F.3d 1 (Nos. 12-5176, 12-5266) [hereinafter 
FDA Brief] (“[The] FDA . . . decline[s] to take enforcement action in the narrow category of cases 
in which drugs are destined for use by States in accordance with their lethal injection laws.”); 
Telephone Interview with Chris McDaniel, Investigative Reporter, BuzzFeed News (Jan. 8, 2019) 
(“The FDA does not regulate lethal injection. It does not want to regulate lethal injection.”). 
7 See Compounding and the FDA: Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/pharmacycompounding/ucm3
39764.htm [https://perma.cc/2X5Z-LKAH] (last updated June 21, 2018) (“Generally, state boards of 
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compounders, some states have passed laws that insulate these compounders 
from regulation by state boards of pharmacy, medicine, and health.8 In fact, over 
twenty states have passed secrecy laws or engaged in practices that forbid public 
disclosure of their suppliers’ identities in order to encourage compounders to 
enter into contracts to supply states compounded lethal drugs.9 
Non-regulation of compounded lethal drugs has contributed to a disturbing 
series of botched executions. In 2012, a death-row inmate’s heart continued to 
beat for at least twenty minutes after South Dakota officials injected him with 
compounded lethal drugs for execution.10 In 2014, an Arizona death-row inmate 
died after two hours of “gasping and snorting.”11 Five of the eleven men 
executed in Texas in 2018 indicated in their final moments that they could feel 
the compounded drugs burning their bodies inside out.12 
Non-regulation of compounded lethal drugs also poses profound dangers 
to the public. A 2018 article in the Journal of the American Pharmacists 
Association observed that an unregulated supply chain of these substandard 
drugs threatens the general public: 
With states increasingly using compounded medicines in executions, there is a 
greater risk that non-pharmaceutical-grade, substandard or contaminated 
product will enter the United States market . . . . The secrecy surrounding the 
execution drug procurement practices of death-penalty states risks undermining 
channels for the importation of medicines that are otherwise safe and effective. 
Once an illicit supply channel is established with a supplier, it is extremely 
challenging to control which drug products move through it and which 
customers they reach, particularly in a context where the FDA, DEA [Drug 
Enforcement Administration], and state boards of pharmacy are prevented from 
 
pharmacy have primary responsibility for the day-to-day oversight of state-licensed pharmacies that 
are not registered with [the] FDA as outsourcing facilities.”). 
8 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (2019) (“The compounding of such drugs pursuant to 
the terms of such a contract . . . is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Pharmacy, the 
Board of Medicine, or the Department of Health Professions . . . .”). 
9 For a full list, see State by State Lethal Injection Protocols, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection [https://perma.cc/VR54-R88L] (last visited Apr. 
14, 2019) [hereinafter State by State Lethal Injection Protocols]. 
10 Laura Sullivan, Missouri Execution Stalled over Lethal Drugs in Short Supply, NPR (Feb. 18, 2014), 
https://www.npr.org/2014/02/18/279216377/missouri-execution-stalled-over-lethal-drugs-in-short-supply 
[https://perma.cc/CQ33-HT6N]. 
11 Ellen Killoran, Arizona Botched Lethal Injection: Secrecy, Compounding Pharmacies and the 
Eighth Amendment, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 26, 2014), https://www.ibtimes.com/arizona-botched-
lethal-injection-secrecy-compounding-pharmacies-eighth-amendment-1639770 [https://perma.cc/
YK2W-KPU3]. 
12 Chris McDaniel, Inmates Said the Drug Burned as They Died. This Is How Texas Gets Its Execution 
Drugs., BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/chrismcdaniel/inmates-
said-the-drug-burned-as-they-died-this-is-how-texas?fbclid=IwAR0qLzEqTvbRaL-VJx_UmXT3ravJEyt
_-lMgESWiu14VtE8YHmmDJToLx8g [https://perma.cc/TRF3-QZ3K]. 
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performing their usual regulatory duties. These practices also create the risk that 
substandard execution drugs fall directly into the wider patient population. This 
has already happened in the manufactured drug context in several documented 
instances in which lethal injection drugs were diverted into the patient market.13 
Constitutional litigation is one strategy to urge state or federal governments 
to regulate compounded lethal drugs. However, if the Supreme Court’s past 
rulings on the constitutionality of lethal injection provide any clue, it is unlikely 
the Court would find execution by these unregulated, compounded lethal drugs 
to be unconstitutional.14 This Comment takes a different path of urging 
regulation by focusing on administrative litigation against the FDA. 
Compounded drugs used in lethal injection are, after all, drugs. A core 
component of the FDA’s mission is to regulate drugs. It is the Food and Drug 
Administration. And yet the FDA refuses to regulate these drugs. 
The FDA can refuse to regulate these drugs because the law insulates its 
inaction from judicial review. While courts regularly conduct arbitrary and 
capricious review of agency enforcement actions, they are far more reluctant 
to review agency inaction. In fact, the Supreme Court has created a 
presumption against judicial review of agency inaction.15 The basic idea 
behind this principle is that agencies are far better positioned than courts to 
know how to allocate regulatory priorities against scarce resources to achieve 
their statutory duties.16 So, the reasoning goes, courts should not be in the 
business of second-guessing agency inaction. This presumption is powerful 
because it closes the door to litigants at the outset of litigation regardless of 
how strong their claims are on the merits. Simply put, courts are foreclosed 
from reviewing FDA inaction. 
The presumption against judicial review seems unreasonable when the 
stakes are so high for death row inmates and the public at large. Although the 
presumption against judicial review may be a sound principle generally, the 
FDA’s refusal to regulate compounded lethal drugs is the kind of agency inaction 
that one might think necessitates at least some judicial scrutiny. I therefore 
propose creating a narrow avenue of judicial review for cases like these. My rule, 
 
13 Prashant Yadav et al., When Government Agencies Turn to Unregulated Drug Sources: Implications for 
the Drug Supply Chain and Public Health Are Grave, 58 J. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N 477, 479 (2018). 
14 See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that 
Oklahoma’s off-label use of midazolam in executions carried a demonstrated risk of severe pain, even 
though it had led to several recent botched executions); see also Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1118–
19, 1133 (2019) (declining to find that the intended method of execution was unconstitutional because the 
petitioner failed to provide a sufficiently detailed plan on how he would be executed through an 
alternative, feasible method associated with a significantly lower risk of severe pain). 
15 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to take 
enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review . . . .”). 
16 See id. at 831-32 (“The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many 
variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.”). 
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what I will call “discrete look,” identifies opportunities for judicial review that 
are sensible and manageable for the courts to engage in, while also keeping these 
avenues sufficiently narrow to respect the underlying policy rationales of the 
existing doctrine. Under discrete look, when death row inmates sue the FDA for 
its failure to regulate compounded lethal drugs, courts can no longer treat the 
FDA’s inaction as an exercise of unreviewable enforcement discretion. 
This Comment first establishes in Part I that the FDA has jurisdiction to 
regulate compounded lethal drugs. This is an important premise because an 
agency’s duty to regulate presupposes that it has jurisdiction to regulate in the 
first place. Part I then moves on to show that under existing case law, the FDA 
is not subject to judicial review for refusing to regulate compounded lethal 
drugs. In Part II, I propose a rule, which I label “discrete look,” that would 
allow judicial review in cases like these. My rule is broad in the sense that it is 
not bound to the context of lethal injection, but it is narrow in the sense that 
it requires plaintiffs to meet a test to qualify for judicial review. Part II then 
applies discrete look to the case of lethal injections to show that the FDA’s 
inaction in that context would be subject to judicial review. Finally, I discuss 
the general benefits discrete look brings to administrative law. 
I. REVIEW UNDER CURRENT LAW 
Section A of this Part shows that the FDA can regulate compounded lethal 
drugs. It first explains the statutory framework for FDA jurisdiction. Next, it 
discusses how two states have responded to claims about FDA jurisdiction. 
Finally, it addresses objections that Congress did not intend the FDA to have 
jurisdiction and that jurisdiction would produce an absurd outcome. 
Section B ﬁrst describes the Supreme Court case that created the 
presumption against judicial review of agency inaction. Then it discusses how 
the circuit courts have developed this doctrine. It concludes that under 
existing law, FDA inaction toward compounded lethal drugs is unreviewable. 
A. The FDA Has Jurisdiction to Regulate Compounded Lethal Drugs 
The FDA can regulate compounded lethal drugs because they are “new 
drugs.” The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) charges the FDA 
to regulate the interstate activity of new drugs, which the statute deﬁnes as 
any drug “the composition of which is such that such drug is not generally 
recognized . . . as safe and eﬀective . . . .”17 For new drugs to enter the market, 
they must undergo an expensive and lengthy FDA clinical trial process to 
 
17 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2018). 
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establish that they are “safe and eﬀective.”18 Although the FDA’s statutory 
framework never expressly says that compounded lethal drugs are new drugs, 
the statute’s text requires this conclusion for two reasons. 
First, a compounded drug is a new drug because of the term’s broad 
deﬁnition. Compounders create new drugs all the time when they compound 
because the act of compounding requires mixing existing drugs to achieve a 
unique composition as the end product. As the Fifth Circuit noted in a case 
turning on this very issue,  
If a compounder changes the composition of an approved drug—by mixing or 
combining an approved drug with something else to create a different substance 
or by creating special dosage or delivery forms of an approved drug inconsistent 
with a drug’s labeling—the composition of the individualized concoction 
created by a compounding pharmacist will not have been previously approved 
for use. The resulting substance is therefore a ‘new drug.’19 
Second, the structure of the FDA’s statutory scheme assumes that 
compounded drugs are new drugs. The 1997 Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act (FDAMA) empowered the FDA to regulate 
compounders.20 The relevant provision declared that the FDA’s new drug 
requirements “shall not apply” to a compounded drug product “if the drug 
product meets the requirements of this section.”21 Because the Act allows 
compounders to be exempt from new drug regulations only if compounders 
met certain exemption conditions, compounded drugs are by deﬁnition new 
drugs—otherwise, there would be no need for Congress to create the 
exemption. As the Fifth Circuit observed, it is “‘a cardinal principle of 
statutory construction’ that a statute be construed such that ‘no clause 
sentence, or word shall be superﬂuous, void or insigniﬁcant.’”22 Since the 
lethal drugs discussed in this Comment are compounded, they must also by 
deﬁnition be new drugs.23 
Although compounders are exempt from the FDA’s new drug regulations 
when they meet certain exemption conditions, they fail to meet these 
exceptions here. The FDA has provided guidance documents that detail these 
exemption conditions. One guidance document highlighted the ﬁrst statutory 
exemption condition as key: “[t]he drug product is compounded for an 
 
18 See id. § 355(b) (detailing process for new human drugs); id. § 360b(b) (detailing process for 
new animal drugs). 
19 Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 395 (5th Cir. 2008). 
20 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 503A, 111 
Stat. 2296, 2328 (codiﬁed at 21 U.S.C. § 353(a) (2018)). 
21 § 353a(a). 
22 Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 406 (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). 
23 Id. 
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identiﬁed individual patient based on the receipt of a valid prescription order, 
or a notation, approved by the prescribing practitioner . . . .” 24 A second 
guidance document elaborated that “a valid prescription order for a 
compounded drug product means a valid prescription order from a licensed 
physician or other licensed practitioner authorized by state law to prescribe 
drugs (prescriber).”25 The guidance explained that statutory conditions to 
exemption exist “to help ensure that compounding . . . is based on individual 
patient needs . . . [and that compounders] are not actually operating as 
conventional manufacturers.”26 
Here, state correctional facilities are not exempt from the FDA’s new drug 
regulation because they cannot meet the exemption conditions. Consider the 
oﬃcial advisory opinion that Virginia’s Attorney General wrote to Virginia 
state legislators in 2016 on this very question. In his opinion, the Attorney 
General examined the exemption conditions in the 1997 Act and admitted 
that Virginia’s lethal injection system failed to meet the exemption condition 
that required a valid prescription for an identiﬁed individual patient.27 
Virginia understandably lacks this kind of prescription because the 
Hippocratic Oath—the ethical creed of the medical profession—specifically 
upholds that “[t]o please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug . . . .”28 
Likewise, the American Medical Association (AMA)’s Code of Medical Ethics 
states that “as a member of a profession dedicated to preserving life when there 
is hope of doing so, a physician must not participate in a legally authorized 
execution.”29 The Code specifies that participation includes “[p]rescribing or 
administering . . . medications that are part of the execution procedure.”30 
Interestingly, Georgia is an outlier state in its attempt to create a valid 
prescription for these drugs. According to a news report, Georgia has contracted 
a doctor—whose identity is specifically protected by a secrecy law—to write 
 
24 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PHARMACY COMPOUNDING OF HUMAN DRUG PRODUCTS 
UNDER SECTION 503A OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 3 (2016) 
[hereinafter PHARMACY COMPOUNDING GUIDANCE] (citing § 353a(a)). 
25 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PRESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT UNDER SECTION 503A OF 
THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 7 (2016). 
26 Id. at 5. 
27 Virginia Attorney General Mark R. Herring, Opinion Letter at 6-7, 9 (Apr. 19, 2016) 
[hereinafter Herring Opinion], https://www.oag.state.va.us/ﬁles/Opinions/2016/Miller_et_al__16-
014.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2TR-72GN]. However, the Attorney General opined that despite the 
fact that Virginia’s compounded drugs used for lethal injection did not have a prescription, he did 
not think that lethal compounded drugs were subject to FDA regulation. Id. 
28 Hippocratic Oath, FREE DICTIONARY, https://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
Hippocratic+oath [https://perma.cc/QZ2R-9G76] (last visited on Apr. 14, 2019). 
29 Capital Punishment: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 9.7.3, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-
assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/capital-punishment [https://perma.cc/7MAX-7MP5] (last visited April 
14, 2019). 
30 Id. 
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prescription orders for individual inmates on death row.31 The doctor sends the 
“prescription order” to the compounder with the name and information of the 
inmate, listing the inmate as the individual “patient.”32 However, Georgia’s 
practice does not undermine the FDA’s jurisdictional reach for two reasons. 
First, a state must surmount the challenge of showing that a valid 
prescription order can even exist for something like compounded lethal 
drugs. Federal regulations state that in order for a “prescription for a 
controlled substance to be eﬀective [it] must be issued for a legitimate 
medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his 
professional practice.”33 Compounded lethal drugs are not on the list of 
“controlled substances,” but they seem to share the same, if not greater, 
qualities for abusive and dangerous use as controlled substances.34 Although 
this particular regulation does not bar a prescription order for compounded 
lethal drugs, it demonstrates that federal regulators reserve valid 
prescriptions of dangerous substances for medical reasons that arise in 
everyday practice. In light of the Hippocratic Oath and the AMA’s position 
against such prescriptions, Georgia’s insistence that it uses a valid 
prescription order becomes even weaker. 
Second, even if Georgia can avoid regulation, its method appears to be 
the exception and not the rule. I could not locate another state that also uses 
a “prescription order” for every death row “patient.” Indeed, if Georgia’s 
strategy were a viable way to be exempt from new drug regulation and a 
model for other states, Virginia’s Attorney General would not have candidly 
admitted in an oﬃcial advisory opinion in 2016 that such a prescription order 
was “unavailable” and therefore a compounder would facially fail one of the 
statutory exemption conditions.35 Thus for purposes of my discussion, I can 
safely assume that the FDA would still have jurisdiction of compounded 
lethal drugs in most states. 
Still, one might object that Congress did not intend the FDA to have 
jurisdiction over compounded lethal drugs when it passed the FDAMA. This 
congressional-intent objection takes two forms. The first argues that Congress’s 
intent to solve a problem was not broad enough to cover the particular issue 
now in question. The second argues that Congress would not have intended the 
 
31 Bill Rankin, The Secrets of the Death Penalty, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 24, 2015), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/the-secrets-the-death-penalty/4MGsZNIPtwg0h9Mg1yolpO/ [https://
perma.cc/2BCX-TNQ8]. 
32 Id. 
33 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2018). 
34 Cf., e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (2018) (“The term ‘controlled substance’ means a drug or other 
substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V . . . .”). 
35 See Herring Opinion, supra note 27, at 6-7. 
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statute it created to be interpreted to arrive at an absurd result. Neither is 
persuasive here. 
The ﬁrst objection amounts to a debate about scope. The U.S. Senate 
Labor and Human Resources Committee Report indicated that limited FDA 
regulation was needed to “prevent small-scale manufacturing under the guise 
of compounding.”36 Since compounded lethal drugs, the argument goes, are 
not produced in bulk or commercially available to the public, they do not 
implicate Congress’s concern about manufacturers in disguise. 
This argument about congressional intent, however, does not produce such 
a narrow result. In passing the 1997 FDAMA to modernize the FDA’s regulatory 
toolkit, Congress seemed concerned about any kind of compounding that was 
not based on legitimate individual patient needs. The same Senate Committee 
Report noted that “[t]he exemptions . . . are limited to compounding for an 
individual patient based on the medical need of such patient for the particular 
drug compounded.37 The Report continued: “To qualify for the exemptions, the 
pharmacist or physician must be able to cite a legitimate medical need for the 
compounded product that would explain why a commercially available drug 
product would not be appropriate.”38 Further, according to the FDA, even 
compounders who are exempt from new drug regulations can still be subject to 
a series of other FDA regulations.39 These include requirements for sanitary 
packing conditions, purity and strength levels, and labeling, advertising, and 
promotion that is not false or misleading.40 This shows that Congress intended 
the 1997 FDAMA to empower the FDA to have at least some regulatory 
authority over all compounders—a wider intent than simply stopping 
commercial manufacturers in disguise. 
Further, statutes can cover speciﬁc problems that Congress did not, or 
could not, anticipate. As the Supreme Court underscored, “statutory 
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably 
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than 
the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”41 
Congress did not think about lethal compounders when it acted in 1997 
because they did not exist: the ﬁrst recorded use of compounded lethal drugs 
 
36 S. REP. NO. 105–43, at 67 (1997). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 67-68. 
39 See PHARMACY COMPOUNDING GUIDANCE, supra note 24, at 6-7. 
40 Id. 
41 Oncale v. Sundownder Oﬀshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); see also Brett M. 
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2143-2144 (2016) (reviewing 
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (“Chief Judge Katzmann puts it well: ‘it is 
unreasonable to expect Congress to anticipate all interpretive questions that may present themselves 
in the future,’ particularly when Congress operates under strict ‘time pressures.’”). 
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occurred in 2012.42 But Congress did seem to express a general intent. The 
FDAMA “enhanced FDA’s mission in ways that recognized the Agency 
would be operating in a 21st century characterized by increasing 
technological, trade and public health complexities.”43 Congress recognized 
the growth and widespread use of compounding compared to traditional 
manufacturing. It was concerned about compounders deviating from their 
socially useful and acceptable purpose—mixing drugs to suit the needs of 
individual patients—into other areas that would raise generalizable problems 
worthy of federal regulation. That Congress did not anticipate at the time 
that exemption conditions would empower it to regulate compounded lethal 
drugs says little. What matters is that Congress felt comfortable forgoing 
federal regulation of compounding only where the compounding occurred for 
a narrow and individualized purpose. 
The second objection from congressional intent relies on the absurdity 
doctrine, also known as the “elephant-in-mousehole” principle.44 In FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Supreme Court rejected the FDA’s 
attempt to regulate tobacco products, reasoning that despite the statute’s 
broad deﬁnition of “drug” and “device,” the FDA’s statutory scheme and 
congressional activity suﬃciently indicated that Congress had not given the 
FDA authority over tobacco and tobacco marketing.45 
The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has relied on Brown and the absurdity 
doctrine to claim that the FDA does not have jurisdiction over any articles, 
including lethal drugs, used in executions.46 Its argument proceeds as follows: 
 
1. A core mission of the FDA is to ensure that drugs and devices are 
“safe.”47 This means that the drug’s or device’s therapeutic attributes 
outweigh its risk of harm.48 
 
42 See Compounding Pharmacies, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/lethal-injection/compounding-pharmacies [https://perma.cc/
K5GM-Rh43] (last visited Oct. 21, 2019) [hereinafter Compounding Pharmacies]. 
43 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/lawsenforcedbyfda/signiﬁcantamendmentstothefdcact/
fdama/default.htm [https://perma.cc/P22N-M8R3] (last updated Mar. 29, 2018). 
44 See Whitman v. American Trucking Association, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress, we have 
held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary 
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”). 
45 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000). 
46 Whether the Food & Drug Admin. Has Jurisdiction over Articles Intended for Use in 
Lawful Executions, slip op. at 1, 1-2 (Oﬃce of Legal Counsel May 3, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/
olc/opinion/ﬁle/1162686/download [https://perma.cc/FM2Q-BFPJ]. 
47 See id. at 11 (noting that “[u]nder the FDCA, a ‘new drug’ may not go to market unless FDA 
determines . . . that the substance is ‘safe’ and ‘eﬀective[]’”) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(1) (2018)). 
48 Id. (“[A] drug is unsafe if its potential for inﬂicting death . . . is not oﬀset by the possibility 
of therapeutic beneﬁt.” (quoting United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 556 (1979))). 
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2. Execution drugs and devices are inherently unsafe because they are 
used for death, not therapy.49 So if the FDA could regulate them, it 
would have to ban them outright.50 
3. The Constitution and federal statutes expressly allow the death penalty.51 
4. Therefore, it cannot be the case that Congress intended the FDA to 
have jurisdiction over articles used in executions.52 
 
As an initial matter, this Comment does not take a position on whether 
the FDA should ban lethal injection drugs. This Comment’s discussion does 
not turn on resolving that particular issue, and at any rate the OLC’s 
absurdity theory is unpersuasive for three reasons. 
First, even if FDA jurisdiction over compounded lethal drugs required 
the FDA to ban them outright, this does not necessarily violate Congress’s 
intent. In Brown, the Supreme Court pointed to six separate pieces of 
legislation addressing tobacco use and human health, along with a failed 
congressional attempt to extend FDA jurisdiction to tobacco, to arrive at the 
conclusion that “Congress has persistently acted to preclude a meaningful 
role for any administrative agency in making policy on the subject of tobacco 
and health.”53 By contrast, in this case, Congress has not persistently spoken 
on the viability of lethal injection as a method of execution—in fact, it has 
not spoken on the issue at all. Congress has approved of the death penalty, 
but it has not set up a federal death penalty scheme where lethal injection is 
the exclusive—or even listed—form of execution.54 
Not only is this case distinguishable from Brown, it is also analogous to a 
case where a court expressly rejected the absurdity objection. In Cook v. FDA, 
the D.C. Circuit Court aﬃrmed the district court’s permanent injunction 
requiring the FDA to forbid the import of sodium thiopental, a critical 
anesthetic used in executions.55 In that case, a provision of the FDCA 
required the FDA to refuse admission of misbranded or unapproved new 
drugs into the country.56 The D.C. Circuit ruled that since the imported 
anesthetic was a misbranded and unapproved new drug, the FDA was 
 
49 Id. (“[T]here is no way products intended to carry out capital punishment could ever satisfy 
that [cost-beneﬁt] test . . . .”). 
50 Id. at 12-13 (“In sum, if articles intended for use in capital punishment were regulated as 
‘drugs’ or ‘devices,’ then the FDCA would prohibit them altogether.”). 
51 Id. at 10 (“[T]he Constitution and laws of the United States presuppose the continued 
availability of capital punishment for the most heinous federal and state crimes.”). 
52 Id. at 26. 
53 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 156 (2000), superseded by statute, 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009). 
54 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3599 (2018). 
55 733 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
56 Id. at 7. 
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required to seize the drugs rather than allow them to be delivered to state 
correctional facilities for use in lethal injection.57 The court recognized the 
stakes of the case by acknowledging that sodium thiopental was no longer in 
domestic production.58 Nonetheless, it aﬃrmed the permanent injunction, 
which appeared to eﬀectively block the last remaining source of the critical 
anesthetic.59 In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly rejected the 
argument that this was an absurd result, citing Supreme Court precedent for 
the proposition that “the Court rarely invokes the absurdity test to override 
unambiguous legislation.”60 
Cook is instructive to this case. There, the unambiguous import statute led 
to a ban on an unapproved new drug that was critical to lethal injection. Here, 
the statutory exemption conditions for compounders is equally unambiguous, 
and therefore a ban on unapproved compounded lethal drugs should be no 
less consistent with Congress’s intent. 
While a ban may be permissible, FDA jurisdiction over lethal 
compounded drugs would not automatically require it. As the Cook court 
observed, “The FDA may exercise enforcement discretion to allow the 
domestic distribution of a misbranded or unapproved new drug, as the 
Supreme Court recognized in Chaney.”61 The FDA could turn that 
enforcement discretion into ensuring that compounded lethal drugs are safer 
and more eﬀective, rather than banning them outright. For example, the FDA 
could enter into agreements with compounders to ensure that their 
procedures for producing compounded lethal drugs are more comparable to 
industry-grade standards. This arrangement is consistent with both Chaney 
and this Comment’s argument. Under Chaney, the FDA’s enforcement 
discretion provides it regulatory options besides an outright ban, as Cook 
observed. And as I discuss in Part II of my Comment, the FDA will be doing 
its job as long as it is engaging in some level of enforcement, including 
through informal means. 
The second reason the OLC opinion is unpersuasive is because one could 
argue that not all compounded lethal drugs necessarily fail the FDA’s 
definition of “safe.” As the Cook court noted, many states conduct lethal 
injection using a three-drug cocktail, the first of which “induces anesthesia.”62 
The anesthetic arguably performs a therapeutic function—namely, rendering 
the person unconscious so that their body does not experience any pain from 
 
57 Id. at 10-11. 
58 Id. at 4, 10-11. 
59 Id. at 1, 4. 
60 Id. at 9 (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 459 (2002) (internal 
brackets omitted)). 
61 Id. at 9-10. 
62 Id. at 4. 
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the second drug, which paralyzes the body, and the third drug, which stops the 
heart.63 The administration of the anesthetic “is critical because absent ‘a 
proper dose . . . render[ing] the prisoner unconscious, there is a substantial, 
constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation from the administration of 
[the second drug] and pain from the injection of [the third drug].’”64 Insofar 
as the anesthetic can pass the cost-benefit requirement to be considered “safe,” 
the second premise of the OLC opinion falters and the FDA does not have to 
ban the anesthetic, thus avoiding the allegedly absurd result. At the very least, 
then, the FDA has some jurisdiction over some compounded lethal drugs.65 
The third reason the OLC opinion is unpersuasive is because this case 
does not implicate the same concerns as Brown. The Brown majority had good 
reason to deny the FDA from running with an admittedly broad deﬁnition 
of “device” to regulate an entire industry, after decades of Congress’s own 
involvement in the ﬁeld. However, that is not the case here. This case presents 
an issue the FDA is intimately familiar with: drugs that are injected into the 
human body to aﬀect its functions—a quintessential area of the FDA’s 
expertise. Nor would FDA regulation catch lethal compounders oﬀ guard. 
Compounders as an industry have operated under FDA regulation since the 
1997 FDAMA. When the ﬁrst known execution by compounded lethal drugs 
happened 15 years later in 2012, compounders were voluntarily creating a new 
product knowing that it would enter into an existing regulatory scheme.66 
To summarize, the FDA can regulate compounded lethal drugs because 
they are “new drugs.” Compounders cannot be exempt from the FDA’s new 
drug regulations because they are not creating lethal drugs for an identified 
individual patient based on the receipt of a valid prescription order. Objections 
to this conclusion focused on congressional intent are ultimately unpersuasive, 
as Congress’s intent is broad enough to address this issue. And including 
 
63 Id. 
64 Id. (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 53 (2008)) (ellipses and ﬁrst alteration in original). 
65 I refer to the anesthetic, which arguably performs a therapeutic function when used in a 
three-drug cocktail, as a compounded lethal drug for two reasons. First, this facilitates ease of 
reference without aﬀecting the legal analysis: a compounded anesthetic is still a new drug that is 
subject to FDA regulation absent satisfying the FDA’s exemption conditions. Second, the anesthetic 
used in lethal injections comes in dosages signiﬁcantly higher than that used in medicinal contexts. 
See, e.g., Gray v. McAuliﬀe, No. 3:16CV982-HEH, 2017 WL 102970, at *9 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2017) 
(“The VDOC will use 500 mg of midazolam as its ﬁrst-stage drug in the three-drug lethal injection 
protocol. Midazolam is used as a sedative. It is a central nervous system and respiratory depressant 
. . . . [M]uch smaller amounts of midazolam are used for medicinal or therapeutic purposes.”); Reid 
v. Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 543, 546–47 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“The ﬁrst drug, sodium thiopental is a 
barbiturate sedative. Two grams of sodium thiopental [used in execution] is approximately ﬁve to 
eight times the dosage that would be used to render a 176 pound individual unconscious for general 
surgery.”). Thus I can safely assume that compounders are creating this anesthetic for the purpose 
of lethal injection, which makes grouping the drugs together appropriate. 
66 See Compounding Pharmacies, supra note 42. 
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compounded lethal drugs within the FDA’s jurisdiction would not lead to an 
absurd result. 
This Section demonstrated that the FDA has jurisdiction to regulate 
compounded lethal drugs. Having established this basic premise, this Comment 
next turns to explore whether the FDA can be subject to judicial review for 
refusing to regulate compounded lethal drugs under that jurisdiction. 
B. FDA Inaction Is Unreviewable Under Existing Law 
The landmark Supreme Court case Heckler v. Chaney established the 
presumption against judicial review of agency inaction.67 In that case, 
plaintiﬀs were death row inmates asking the FDA to halt their execution by 
lethal injection and to seize such drugs.68 Plaintiﬀs claimed that the drugs 
were new and misbranded drugs, and alternatively “suggested that the 
FDCA’s requirements for approval of ‘new drugs’ applied . . . .”69 The 
Supreme Court refused to address the case on the merits and instead 
announced that “an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action should 
be presumed immune from judicial review . . . .”70 The Court observed that 
many reasons justify the general “unsuitability” of judicial review: 
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of 
a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency 
must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency 
resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is 
likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested 
best fits the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has 
enough resources to undertake the action at all. An agency generally cannot 
act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. 
The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many 
variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.71 
There is, however, a way to rebut this presumption of unreviewability. In 
a footnote, Chaney acknowledges that the presumption could be overcome 
where the agency has “consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that 
is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”72 
 
67 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
68 Id. at 823-24. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 832. 
71 Id. at 831-32. 
72 Id. at 833 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)). 
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Chaney did not elaborate on what abdication would look like, but the 
circuit courts have provided a clearer picture of this exception.73 The circuit 
courts that have developed the abdication doctrine can be grouped into two 
categories. The ﬁrst line of circuits (“Line 1”) conducts the abdication analysis 
by looking to what the agency has done with respect to regulation. The second 
line of circuits (“Line 2”) conducts the abdication analysis by examining what 
the agency has said with respect to regulation. The two lines appear to be 
mutually exclusive, meaning that each articulates its own requirement of what 
must be met to allow for judicial review. 
In Line 1 cases, courts look to what the agency does. Courts have refused 
to ﬁnd abdication so long as agencies maintain some level of enforcement 
activity over the issue identiﬁed in the statutory charge. This principle aligns 
closely with the observation of the Chaney Court that “[t]he agency is far 
better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in 
the proper ordering of its priorities.”74 
In operationalizing the concept of enforcement, Line 1 courts find no 
abdication where agencies choose to settle with the regulated party,75 resort to 
informal enforcement measures to effectively induce compliance,76 or decide 
not to bring an enforcement action after a good-faith investigation.77 
Enforcement thus encompasses the agency’s initial steps of looking into a 
problem and deciding whether to take further action.78 Importantly, the court 
conducts the abdication analysis by examining if there is at least some level of 
 
73 None of the three Supreme Court cases since Chaney that discuss judicial review of agency 
inaction directly address nonenforcement decisions. The ﬁrst case prohibits review of an agency’s 
refusal to implement a programmatic proposal. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 
64 (2004). This is relevant to the discrete look rule I propose later, which would limit judicial review 
to an agency’s refusal to take enforcement action against a private party’s violations. The second 
case is not on point because it speciﬁcally limits its discussion of agency inaction to the context of 
rulemaking. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 500 (2007). The third case is also not on point 
because there the agency’s statute contained speciﬁc mandatory procedures that the Court said made 
review possible, whereas the cases this Comment covers are not about procedural compliance. See 
Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1656 (2015). 
74 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32. 
75 See, e.g., Garcia v. McCarthy, 649 F. App’x 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A]n agency’s decision 
to settle falls under the penumbra of agency inaction that has traditionally been subject to a 
rebuttable presumption against judicial review.”). 
76 See, e.g., Block v. SEC, 50 F.3d 1078, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Thus, we cannot agree that the 
Commission has refused to implement § 2(a)(19); the agency has merely chosen thus far to enforce 
it informally rather than formally. So far, it appears, the Commission has found that suﬃcient to 
induce compliance with the law.”). 
77 See, e.g., Greer v. Chao, 492 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Among other actions, OFCCP 
officials visited Eaton, discussed conditions with coworkers, and interviewed managers. These 
investigatory steps are sufficient to indicate that the Secretary discharged her statutory obligations.”). 
78 See id. at 965 (quoting Giacobbi v. Biermann, 780 F. Supp. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 1992)) (“[T]he 
investigation itself, like the ﬁnal decision whether or not to take enforcement action, is within the 
enforcement arena and therefore, committed to agency discretion.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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enforcement across cases. An agency may weigh its priorities and choose not 
to enforce in particular cases while enforcing in other cases.79 A low level of 
enforcement does not amount to abdication of statutory duty, because the 
agency has discretion to choose the level of enforcement so long as it has not 
“totally abdicated its statutory responsibility.”80 
Here, judicial review of FDA inaction toward compounded lethal drugs 
is unavailable under Line 1. The court will look to see if there is some level 
of enforcement of the statutory charge. The FDA’s statutory charge, as 
relevant here, is to regulate new drugs.81 That is a very broad mandate. 
Compounded lethal drugs fall under new drug regulation, as argued earlier, 
and therefore comprise a subset of new drugs.82 Suppose, for the sake of 
argument, that the FDA’s enforcement level of new drugs is dangerously low 
or even nonexistent. The FDA could simply increase its overall new drug 
enforcement level while still leaving compounded lethal drugs completely 
alone. A court following Line 1 will ﬁnd that the FDA has some level of 
enforcement toward new drugs and thus cannot be subject to judicial review. 
In Line 2 cases, courts look to what the agency says. Courts have refused 
to ﬁnd abdication so long as agencies have not articulated a general 
nonenforcement policy.83 The case that established this rule, Crowley 
Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Pena, involved a shipping company that contested 
the Maritime Administrator’s grant of a shipping waiver to a competitor.84 
The D.C. Circuit examined the Administrator’s correspondence letters with 
both parties and found the Administrator’s waiver grant to be a “single-shot 
non-enforcement decision.”85 The court found that the waiver did not 
articulate a general policy and therefore the particular instance of 
nonenforcement was not subject to judicial review.86 The court observed that 
many agency documents, such as “side comments, form letters, litigation 
 
79 See, e.g., Raymond Proﬃtt Found. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 343 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 
2003) (“The Corps has decided, however, to continue to emphasize ﬂood control as the primary 
objective of this particular facility, something the WRDA certainly permits it to do.”). 
80 Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1131 (6th Cir. 1996). 
81 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2018) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into 
interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application ﬁled pursuant to subsection 
(b) or (j) [of this section] is eﬀective with respect to such drug.”). 
82 See supra text accompanying notes 17–23. 
83 See, e.g., Salmon Spawning & Recovery All. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 550 F.3d 1121, 
1129 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that abdication was not an issue in this case because plaintiﬀs did 
not allege any express policy of non-enforcement); Riverkeeper v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 170-71 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (holding that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)’s refusal to implement the 
plaintiﬀ ’s proposed nuclear safety measures was unreviewable because the agency did not articulate 
a policy expressly abdicating any relevant statutory authority). 
84 37 F.3d 671, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
85 Id. at 676. 
86 Id. 
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documents, and informal communications,” would not be reliable indicators 
for the court to “tease[] out” a general nonenforcement policy.87 According to 
the court, documents on this disfavored list indicate “the sort of mingled 
assessments of fact, policy, and law that drive an individual enforcement 
decision” of the nature that Chaney intended courts not to touch.88 
The D.C. Circuit provided two categories of agency documents that it 
would consider as general policies. One category consists of agency policies 
articulated through the full rulemaking process.89 The other category consists 
of agency policies articulated in the form of a “universal policy statement.”90 
Further, while Crowley did not entirely rule out the possibility that agency 
documents from the disfavored list could articulate a general policy,91 such a 
category currently seems to be a null set: in the thirty years since Crowley was 
decided, I could not ﬁnd a single court that has inferred a general 
nonenforcement policy from a document on Crowley’s disfavored list. 
Here, under Line 2, the FDA’s inaction toward compounded lethal drugs 
will also not be subject to judicial review. The FDA has not articulated a 
general nonenforcement policy. And either out of intentional desire to avoid 
judicial review or simply the inertia of not needing to announce a policy of 
inaction, the FDA will likely continue to remain silent. Even if it had zero 
level of enforcement, the agency would not be subject to review because the 
court can only look at what the FDA has said about its nonenforcement 
policies. The best evidence that plaintiffs have of a general nonenforcement 
policy is the FDA’s long-standing position that it declines to take enforcement 
action “in the narrow category of cases in which drugs are destined for use by 
States in accordance with their lethal injection laws.”92 But this policy statement 
was made in a litigation document, which is on Crowley’s disfavored list. 
Supposing that the court would allow the rare inference of a general policy from 
litigation documents, the FDA could preempt this possibility by simply 
omitting this language from its documents going forward. Furthermore, as with 
Line 1, Line 2 seems to analyze policies at the general level of the statutory 
charge. Thus, it is not clear that even a general nonenforcement policy toward 
compounded lethal drugs would persuade a court that the FDA was 
abdicating its duty of regulating new drugs. 
This Section demonstrates that under the reasoning of either Line 1 or Line 
2, FDA inaction is unreviewable. Yet it seems incomplete to rest abdication 
analysis either exclusively on what an agency has done or what it has said at the 
 
87 Id. at 677. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 676 (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 980 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
90 Id. (citing Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
91 Id. at 677. 
92 FDA Brief, supra note 6, at 19. 
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general level of the statutory charge. This Comment next discusses the 
problems with this case law and creates a new rule to fix those flaws. 
II. REVIEW UNDER DISCRETE LOOK 
I have shown that a challenge to FDA inaction is unreviewable under 
existing case law. In this Part, I generalize the ﬂaws of the existing law and 
propose a solution by introducing the discrete look rule. I then discuss how 
the rule works in practice. 
A. Discrete Look Described 
Abdication analysis under the current circuit case law provides at best a 
tiny peephole of judicial review. First, when courts look at agency inaction, 
they only look at it in relation to the general level of the statutory charge. 
They refuse to look below the statutory charge to any particular issue, or 
“subset,” of the statutory charge, even if the agency is completely refusing to 
enforce that subset. Second, when courts look at agency inaction, they look 
either to what an agency has done to determine if some level of enforcement 
exists or to what an agency has said about its enforcement policies, but not 
both. It will be the rare case indeed where an agency engages in no level of 
enforcement of its statutory charge or where an agency has announced a 
general nonenforcement policy. Most agency refusal patterns are not that 
broad in scope or that conspicuous in nature. So the existing framework 
results in hardly any judicial review in practice. The high stakes of this case 
for death row inmates and the public at large challenge the workability of this 
rigid presumption against judicial review. 
This Comment proposes a new rule to remedy these problems by opening 
a narrow avenue for judicial review. Under this rule, abdication analysis can 
occur at not just the general level of the statutory charge (the “statutory 
level”), but also at any discrete subset of the statutory charge (the “discrete 
level”). That is, a court can look at agency refusals to enforce a discrete subset 
that falls within an agency’s broader statutory charge—a practice I have been 
calling “discrete look.” Further, this Comment proposes a hybrid rule that 
merges Line 1 and Line 2 so that they are no longer mutually exclusive; 
meeting either will be suﬃcient to allow judicial review. 
One might worry that a rule about discrete nonenforcement could be so 
sweeping as to be unworkable or burdensome on the courts. Thus, this proposed 
rule has two further constraints. First, the rule only applies to agency refusals 
to take enforcement action against a private party’s violations. This prevents 
agencies from being harassed for refusing to implement private proposals on 
how best to go about doing their job. Second, the rule only applies when an 
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agency’s refusal to enforce occurs against the backdrop of a unitary regulatory 
scheme—that is, when no other regulator can step in to take action. 
To summarize, the discrete look rule requires a court to conduct arbitrary 
and capricious review of an agency’s (1) discrete (2) nonenforcement (3) of 
violations (4) within a unitary regulatory scheme. 
1. Discrete 
Establishing a discrete subset requires passing a two-step test. First, the 
desired target of regulation must fall within a subset of a statutory charge that 
the agency is tasked to regulate. Courts should conduct this subset analysis 
using Chevron deference toward the agency because the agency has the 
expertise and policy tools to interpret the scope of its statutory duty.93 Under 
Chevron, the court defers to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguity in the 
statute so long as the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.94 For example, an 
agency tasked with regulating vegetables might refuse to regulate tomatoes 
because it ﬁnds “vegetable” to be an ambiguous word and reasonably 
interprets it to exclude tomatoes. In that case, tomatoes are not a discrete 
subset of all vegetables, because tomatoes are not reasonably understood by 
the agency to be a subset in the ﬁrst place. As a result, the agency’s lack of 
enforcement toward tomatoes should not be subject to judicial review. 
Second, the desired object of regulation must be discrete. The Merriam-
Webster Dictionary deﬁnes “discrete” as “constituting a separate entity: 
individually distinct” or “taking on or having a ﬁnite . . . number of values.”95 
Thus, courts should consider whether the subset in question can be thought 
of as “individually distinct” from the other subsets that fall within the 
statutorily charge. The Supreme Court’s reﬁnement of “discrete” in its equal 
protection jurisprudence may be a useful guide. In the famous “Footnote 
Four” of United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Court observed that certain 
legislation could give rise to a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis 
review when it prejudiced “discrete and insular minorities.”96 Professor Bruce 
Ackerman helpfully deﬁned the Court’s understanding of “discrete” as 
referring to 
members [that] are marked out in ways that make it relatively easy for others 
to identify them. For instance, there is nothing a black woman may plausibly 
do to hide the fact that she is black or female. Like it or not, she will have to 
 
93 See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
94 Id. at 845. 
95 Discrete, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/discrete [https://perma.cc/H5HR-GWAR] (last visited on Apr. 14, 2019). 
96 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
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deal with the social expectations and stereotypes generated by her evident 
group characteristics.97 
If evident minority characteristics associated with discrimination are the 
mark of discreteness in the constitutional context, courts can ask what makes 
subsets “evident” in the administrative law context. For example, is the subset 
one that has emerged recently? If so, judicial review could help clarify the 
agency’s relationship to it. Does the subset carry sizeable economic 
consequences? If so, that may make review a worthwhile expenditure of judicial 
resources. Does the subset implicate the agency’s ability to faithfully carry out 
its mission? All subsets theoretically do, but those that especially do should merit 
more attention. These questions are a starting point with room for refinement 
rather than an exhaustive list. Over time, because agencies are repeat players in 
the courts, parties can develop a working expectation of what is “discrete” that 
maps onto the unique specialties of each agency. The point here is that a discrete 
subset, by definition, would stand out enough to be worth judicial review. 
2. Nonenforcement 
A court should analyze nonenforcement on the discrete level in the same 
way that it currently analyzes nonenforcement on the statutory level. How 
much enforcement is enough? I suggest that this necessarily is a fact-speciﬁc 
inquiry. One instance of enforcement in the past year on an issue that rarely 
comes up seems to pass. However, one instance of enforcement in the past 
year on a common issue with hundreds of missed enforcement opportunities 
that the agency refuses to deal with would probably not pass. While “some” 
literally means “greater than zero,” “some level” still implies a degree rather 
than an absolute count. Another way to think about it is to ask if the agency 
demonstrates either total nonenforcement or severe under-enforcement to 
the practical eﬀect of nonenforcement.98 However diﬃcult this question may 
be, it would not be too demanding for courts, as they are comfortable 
conducting this kind of line-drawing inquiry in other contexts.99 
Further, the nonenforcement analysis should combine the reasoning of 
Line 1 and Line 2. That is, the court should look to what an agency is doing 
and what it is saying, on the discrete level. Thus, the court should ask two 
questions. First, is there a general nonenforcement policy of the discrete 
 
97 Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 729 (1985). 
98 See Jentry Lanza, Comment, Agency Underenforcement as Reviewable Abdication, 112 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1171, 1193-1208 (2018) (explaining why severe underenforcement should be treated as 
nonenforcement for purposes of allowing judicial review). 
99 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 171-73 (5th Cir. 2015) (ﬁnding that the 
barebones percentage of applicants denied deferred action amounted to evidence that oﬃcials did 
not make decisions with discretion), aﬀ ’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
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subset? Second, is the agency lacking “some level” of enforcement of the 
discrete subset? Answering “yes” to either question will trigger discrete look. 
The fusion of Line 1 and Line 2 approaches is a straightforward and 
sensible rule for courts to use. As it stands, neither Line is satisfactory on its 
own in closely tracking instances of agency nonenforcement behavior. Line 1 
is more robust because it allows the court to look at what an agency is doing. 
However, one weakness of Line 1 is illuminated when an agency may be 
confronted with a new issue—too new for it to have some level of 
enforcement. The agency can persuasively argue that it is not abdicating its 
duty; rather, the issue is so new that the agency has not even had an 
opportunity to refuse enforcement. Line 2 can address this “temporality” 
problem by looking to what an agency says, which provides the clearest 
indication of nonenforcement behavior. However, its ﬂaw is that its 
determination of abdication rests solely on what an agency says. In eﬀect, the 
agency can control whether it will be subject to judicial review. Together, a 
hybrid rule will allow courts to supplement Line 1 analysis with the rarer 
instances of Line 2 analysis. Compared to the status quo of mutually exclusive 
Lines, this fusion helpfully expands instances of judicial review. 
3. Violation 
Plaintiffs should only be allowed to challenge agency inaction when the 
agency is refusing to take enforcement action against a private party’s violation. 
Limiting this rule to violations directly addresses the concerns of Norton v. 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.100 In that case, plaintiff challenged the Bureau 
of Land Management (“BLM”)’s refusal to ban off-road vehicles in designated 
areas, arguing that BLM needed to enforce this ban to fulfill its statutory duty 
of wilderness preservation.101 However, nothing in the text of BLM’s statutory 
charge required it to ban off-road vehicles. The Court held that BLM had broad 
discretion to decide how to achieve wilderness preservation, making BLM’s 
rejection of plaintiff ’s “programmatic” proposal unreviewable.102 The Court 
worried that to allow judicial review of an agency’s rejection of a programmatic 
proposal “would ultimately become the task of the supervising court, rather 
than the agency, to work out compliance with the broad statutory mandate, 
injecting the judge into day-to-day agency management.”103 
A violation is qualitatively diﬀerent from a programmatic proposal. A 
violation by deﬁnition has contradicted the regulatory scheme; a proposal is 
simply one suggestion for how an agency should handle its regulatory scheme. 
 
100 542 U.S. 55 (2004). 
101 Id. at 60-61. 
102 Id. at 64, 67. 
103 Id. at 66-67. 
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Agencies are tasked with addressing violations, but it is up to them to decide 
which proposals to adopt. An agency can consistently reject a line of policy 
suggestions, because as the expert in the ﬁeld, it can choose how to best 
achieve its enforcement duties. By contrast, an agency that consistently 
refuses to enforce a line of violations does not look like it is doing its job. 
4. Unitary Regulatory Scheme 
Even after plaintiﬀ satisﬁes the ﬁrst three elements of this test, courts 
should only allow review if plaintiﬀ has no other recourse through an 
overlapping regulatory scheme. An agency may choose not to act for a variety 
of valid reasons, one of which is that it made a calculation that its inaction is 
not the ﬁnal word in the context of a broader regulatory scheme. Although 
agencies specialize, few issues today are covered or solvable by only one 
agency. One of the main functions of the Oﬃce of Information and 
Regulatory Aﬀairs (“OIRA”) is to smooth out inter-agency policies to ensure 
that they work together.104 The same can be said for the executive branch’s 
international regulatory scheme.105 Regulatory schemes are thus intricate and 
complex. One agency’s inaction may actually be in purposeful horizontal 
coordination with another agency’s action. When performing this analysis, 
courts should ask if there really is an overlapping regulatory scheme.106 
Sometimes it may appear so because of general subject-matter similarities, 
but if Congress only gave one agency the regulatory tools such that no other 
agency can provide similar relief for similar claims, then the regulatory 
scheme is unitary. 
Regulatory overlap may also exist vertically across federal and state 
governments. A federal agency may choose not to act because it determines 
that a state engages in its own regulatory activity in that ﬁeld, and therefore 
federal action would be redundant and wasteful. However, vertical overlap is 
less likely to be satisfactory. This is because state action may vary in its 
purposes and scope from federal action and might not actually cover the ﬁeld 
the agency has a duty to regulate. Further, a lawsuit may feature multiple 
plaintiﬀs, some of whom come from states with regulatory schemes while 
others do not, in which case the vertical overlap would have “holes” requiring 
federal action to ﬁll. To address these concerns, the court should simply 
 
104 Oﬃce of Management and Budget, Information and Regulatory Aﬀairs, THE WHITE HOUSE 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-aﬀairs/ 
[https://perma.cc/JK8A-BSQR]. 
105 See generally Exec. Order No. 13609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413 (May 1, 2012) (dividing authority 
amongst and ensuring coordination among numerous federal agencies in the natural defense space). 
106 One court did so in a recent case. See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 161 nn.4-5 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (considering the relationship other agencies may have in fulfilling the regulatory scheme). 
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presume that no vertical regulatory overlap exists. The federal agency can 
rebut this presumption by providing the court with suﬃcient evidence of 
state regulatory activity in every state from which plaintiﬀs sue. As with 
horizontal regulatory overlap, the federal agency here has the most knowledge 
of what regulatory activity already exists in states. If it not acting because it 
sees that states are already doing something, then surely it can point the court 
to what it is that the states in question are doing. 
* * * 
Discrete look borrows procedurally from the Court’s burden-shifting 
mechanism in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.107 In summary judgment, the movant 
need only to point to an absence of a dispute of material fact to get the motion 
considered. The non-movant then responds with aﬃrmative evidence of a 
dispute of material fact. The court then decides the motion. This is not an 
empty standard, but it is understandably lenient. 
Likewise, here the plaintiﬀ must show a negative. The ﬁrst way to do so 
is to point to a general nonenforcement policy. The second is to show that the 
agency’s enforcement level has not reached the “some level” standard 
discussed above. For new issues, the ﬁrst way alleviates the temporality 
problem. If that avenue is not available, plaintiﬀs can try to persuade the 
court that an issue is ripe for abdication analysis by pointing to the number 
of years or potential number of cases that have elapsed since the time the 
agency was ﬁrst on notice about the issue. Coordinated litigation can also 
demonstrate a pattern of refusals to enforce. If hundreds of death row inmates 
ﬁle individual complaints before the FDA and receive refusals to enforce, 
then that leaves a record of nonenforcement. 
If the plaintiﬀ satisﬁes the negative showing, the agency must then 
respond. It can provide an aﬃrmative showing of some level of enforcement, 
contest any allegations of a general nonenforcement policy, or argue under 
Chevron that the subset is not part of an ambiguous statutory charge. Finally, 
it can provide a persuasive explanation of how an overlapping regulatory 
scheme justiﬁes the agency’s inaction in this particular case. The court must 
then decide whether to allow judicial review. If so, the review is what the 
court normally conducts for agency action: arbitrary and capricious review, 
which includes fact-ﬁnding, full brieﬁng by both parties, hearings with cross-
examination, discovery, expert witnesses, and more.108 If the court ﬁnds that 
 
107 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
108 For examples of how courts conduct arbitrary and capricious review, see generally F.C.C. 
v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009); Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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the agency’s inaction is arbitrary and capricious, it can order the agency to 
increase the level of enforcement of the discrete subset. In more egregious or 
straightforward cases, it can also grant the speciﬁc relief plaintiﬀ requests. 
This Section proposed the discrete look rule and discussed how courts could 
apply it in practice. The rule offers a constrained and targeted form of judicial 
review in cases that might require some kind of judicial scrutiny. The next 
Section specifically applies discrete look to potential cases in which death row 
inmates would sue the FDA for refusing to regulate compounded lethal drugs. 
B. Discrete Look Applied 
This Section applies discrete look to the issue speciﬁcally addressed in 
this Comment: the use of lethal compounded drugs in state executions of 
inmates. This Section shows that a typical case brought by inmates against 
the FDA challenging the lack of regulation of these drugs in executions would 
satisfy the four elements of discrete look. As such, FDA inaction toward 
compounded lethal drugs should be subject to judicial review. 
1. Discrete 
First, compounded lethal drugs are clearly a subset of new drugs that the 
FDA is tasked to regulate. Applying Chevron, a court will likely find that “drug” 
is not ambiguous from the statutory text. The FDA may argue that 
compounded lethal drugs are not really “drugs” to begin with, because drugs 
are meant to heal, not kill people. This is a weak argument, because it turns out 
that the FDCA defines the term: “The term ‘drug’ means . . . articles (other 
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man 
or other animals . . . .”109 Since compounded lethal drugs clearly aim to affect a 
human being’s body, they are unambiguously a subset of new drugs. The phrase 
“compounded lethal drugs” is an apt description rather than a misnomer. 
Second, compounded lethal drugs form a discrete subset. They are 
“individually distinct” because of their unique characteristics. For starters, 
the subset is new, as compounded lethal drugs have only emerged since 
2012.110 Second, it would be helpful for the courts to clarify the relationship 
the FDA has to compounded lethal drugs. Third, compounded lethal drugs 
carry sizeable economic consequences because not only do they sustain the 
administration of lethal injection in the states, their proliferation into illicit 
supply chains can trigger all sorts of disruptive and costly eﬀects for 
 
109 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2018). 
110 See Compounding Pharmacies, supra note 42. 
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regulators.111 Moreover, this subset implicates the public reliance on the 
agency to faithfully carry out its mission. The FDA’s mission, according to its 
website, is to “protect[] the public health by ensuring the safety, eﬃcacy, and 
security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical 
devices . . . .”112 A court does not need to reach far to see that compounded 
lethal drugs, both as they are used to kill people and as distributed into illicit 
supply chains, strongly implicate the FDA mission. Thus, if any subset of 
new drugs stands out as discrete under these questions, compounded lethal 
drugs must surely be it. 
2. Nonenforcement 
The FDA has not expressly articulated a general nonenforcement policy, 
and it is not likely that a court would start inferring general policies from 
documents on Crowley’s disfavored list. Even if it did, the FDA could still 
avoid judicial review on this front by avoiding articulating anything 
resembling a general policy in its nonenforcement letters, litigation 
documents, and the like. 
The better option for litigants is to argue that the FDA has not engaged 
in some level of enforcement of compounded lethal drugs. According to a 
2016 GAO study, from 2012 through 2016 the FDA completed 265 inspections 
of small compounders and other drug compounders.113 The GAO report made 
no mention of FDA regulation of compounded lethal drugs. The primary 
news story tying the FDA to lethal injection was about a compounder in 
Missouri called Apothecary that shut down in 2016 after the FDA and state 
inspectors found a host of unsanitary practices.114 
The FDA can argue that it engaged in some level of regulating 
compounded lethal drugs when its inspections of Apothecary led to the 
seizure of some compounded lethal drugs. It can also argue that its general 
enforcement action (inspecting a compounder for violations) included 
enforcement of a discrete subset (seizing compounded lethal drugs). 
 
111 Yadav, supra note 13, at 479 (“The secrecy surrounding the execution drug procurement 
practices of death-penalty states risks undermining channels for the importation of medicines that 
are otherwise safe and eﬀective.”). 
112 What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do/ 
[https://perma.cc/4GVL-CF4A] (last updated Mar. 28, 2018). 
113 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-64, DRUG COMPOUNDING: FDA HAS 
TAKEN STEPS TO IMPLEMENT COMPOUNDING LAW, BUT SOME STATES AND STAKEHOLDERS 
REPORTED CHALLENGES 40 (2016). 
114 See Chris McDaniel, Pharmacy That Mixed Executions Drugs Is Being Sold After Admitting 
Numerous Violations, BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 21, 2016, 10:45 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/chrismcdaniel/pharmacy-that-mixed-execution-drugs-is-being-sold-after-disc [https://perma.cc/
H77K-95NN]. 
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However, the Apothecary inspection is unpersuasive evidence of “some 
level” of enforcement for two reasons. First, it provides only one episode 
when the FDA interacted with compounded lethal drugs. That hardly 
appears to establish a minimum level of enforcement, given the established 
presence of compounders as the main supplier of lethal drugs since 2012.115 
Second, the FDA’s regulatory connection with compounded lethal drugs 
appeared fortuitous. The FDA’s impetus for investigation seemed to stem 
from a host of violations (unrelated to compounded lethal drugs) rather than 
the fact that Apothecary also happened to compound lethal drugs on the 
side.116 The FDA’s inspection letter to Apothecary117 focused primarily on the 
fact that the compounder did not have individual prescription orders for 
individually-identiﬁed patients and did not maintain a clean environment for 
compounding.118 As further evidence that the FDA targeted Apothecary for 
its general compounding practices, the compounder ended up admitting guilt 
to an astounding 1,892 violations of state pharmacy guidelines.119 The 
inspection letter never mentions lethal injection. To be clear, the motive or 
expectation of the regulator does not necessarily control how “some level” of 
enforcement is counted. However, given that Apothecary is a stand-alone 
case, the motive of the FDA in its regulatory action helps to make sense of 
what kind of regulatory action it was taking. 
Alternatively, the FDA can argue that it has engaged in some level of 
regulating compounded lethal drugs by pointing out that it has at least one such 
compounded drug on its list of banned substances.120 High dosage potassium 
chloride, which appears on this list, can be used as the third and final drug in 
lethal injections that stop the heart.121 This is also a weak argument. For states 
that use three drugs in lethal injection, potassium chloride is only the last 
 
115 See Compounding Pharmacies, supra note 42. 
116 The same can be said for Greenpark, a compounding pharmacy that an undercover news story 
revealed was supplying compounded lethal drugs to Texas. See McDaniel, supra note 12. Compared to 
Apothecary, Greenpark is even more tenuous evidence of FDA regulation because (1) there is no evidence 
that the FDA seized compounded lethal drugs from it and (2) the FDA identified only a handful of 
sanitary issues, suggesting that the inspection was something like a routine checkup. 
117 Warning Letter from Amy Barringer, Acting Dallas Dist. Dir., Pub. Health Serv., Food & Drug 
Admin. to Thomas Marti, President, The Apothecary Shoppe (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/
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llc-474607-08192016 [https://perma.cc/V6U5-6XEY]. 
118 Id. 
119 McDaniel, supra note 114. 
120 See 21 C.F.R. 216.24 (2018) (banning the compounding of “[a]ll solid oral dosage form 
drug products containing potassium chloride that supply 100 milligrams or more of potassium 
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121 Atul Gawande et al., Physicians and Execution—Highlights from a Discussion of Lethal Injection, 
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drug.122 None of the other drugs commonly used in lethal injection appear on 
the banned list. For example, midazolam, which renders the inmate 
unconscious, has been the predominant choice in three-drug executions in the 
past few years.123 Midazolam is not on the FDA’s banned list, even though the 
dosage levels with which compounders produce it is only useful for the 
purposes of execution.124 Potassium chloride’s appearance on the FDA’s banned 
compounding list—conspicuously alone—may be more attributable to the 
FDA’s general concern about the drug’s potency at high dosages rather than a 
specific concern about its use in lethal injection. 
The FDA can try a temporality argument, but it will likely fail. The ﬁrst 
recorded instance of lethal injection by compounded lethal drugs occurred in 
2012.125 The court would likely think that enough time and opportunities have 
passed for enforcement such that the FDA has had the opportunity to 
demonstrate a pattern of nonenforcement. Since 2012, at least several dozen 
executions have used compounded lethal drugs, implying that many more 
compounded drugs have been produced and distributed without any 
regulatory oversight by the FDA.126 Enough time has elapsed to demonstrate 
that the FDA has consistently refused to regulate here. 
3. Violation 
The FDA’s discrete nonenforcement here is toward a violation and not a 
programmatic proposal. As shown above, compounded lethal drugs are new 
drugs, and compounders are not exempt from new drug regulations because 
they do not have valid individual prescription orders. By producing and 
distributing these drugs outside of the FDA’s lengthy and costly new drug 
approval process, compounders violate the FDA’s new drug regulations. 
4. Unitary Regulatory Scheme 
On the federal level, the FDA’s website recognizes that the “FDA’s 
responsibilities are closely related to those of several other government 
agencies.”127 From the FDA’s descriptions of these agencies’ duties, however, 
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only the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) shares jurisdiction with 
the FDA on the subject of drugs.128 The DEA is tasked with regulating ﬁve 
categories of controlled substances that are listed by statute.129 Compounded 
lethal drugs do not fall within that list.130 This issue is therefore outside of 
the DEA’s jurisdiction. Without other federal agencies in play, the FDA’s 
inaction is in a unitary regulatory scheme, unless the states are involved. 
On the state level, a regulatory vacuum, rather than a regulatory overlap, 
exists. The same article in the Journal of the American Pharmacists Association 
that warned against illicit supply chains also noted that “[t]hese execution 
secrecy laws and policies, which have been implemented by twenty-three of 
thirty-one states with the death penalty, eﬀectively—and in some cases 
explicitly—exempt the suppliers of lethal injection drugs from oversight by 
state boards of pharmacy.”131 The growth of laws amongst the states that 
shield compounders from identiﬁcation and regulation shows how void the 
regulatory scheme has become and consequently how urgent the need is for 
the FDA to regulate in this space. Even if a few of the states with the death 
penalty may be engaging in some regulatory oversight of their compounders, 
discrete look would treat this as a unitary regulatory scheme, at least for 
litigation that includes plaintiﬀs from states with an exemption law. 
This Section showed how this case satisﬁes discrete look and therefore 
can be subject to judicial review. The next Section explains the broader 
implications discrete look has for administrative law. 
C. Discrete Look Justified 
This Section discusses the general benefits of allowing targeted judicial 
review under discrete look in administrative law and refutes the notion that 
it asks too much of the courts. It also demonstrates that discrete look beats 
alternative approaches to judicial review that would impose too much of a 
burden on the courts. 
Where an agency has decided that it will not enforce discrete subsets of a 
statutory charge, the courts should have the ability to conduct arbitrary and 
capricious review, in the same way that a court would do so for affirmative 
enforcement actions. We should not think of agency duties as either all-or-
nothing on the level of the statute, but rather as an assortment of responsibilities 
 
128 Id. (“The Department of Justice’s Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) works to 
enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States, including as they pertain 
to the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of legally produced controlled substances.”). 
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that Congress included under a statute for the agency to regulate. Courts should 
have the power to question an agency’s job performance when it consistently 
refuses to enforce some issues under its jurisdiction.132 
Discrete look beneﬁts the public, the agency, and Congress. Litigation 
using discrete look can force an agency to provide an aﬃrmative showing of 
some level of enforcement or an explanation of the overlapping regulatory 
scheme. This allows the public to better understand an agency’s enforcement 
priorities on discrete issues that may otherwise be swallowed by broader 
statutory charges. Increased knowledge of agency inaction also empowers 
lobbying for change and accountability through the political process. Most 
concretely, plaintiﬀs in these cases are often members of the public asking for 
regulation. They beneﬁt from having an opportunity to see some kind of 
regulation that directly aﬀects their interests. 
The agency benefits, too. An agency might be the expert, but that does not 
mean it is always doing the best resource allocation and priority-setting. Having 
to explain its reasons helps the agency identify inconsistencies and inaccurate 
assumptions in its enforcement priorities. Even the specter of litigation could 
incentivize the agency to give its enforcement levels a second look. Because an 
agency will have a duty to show some levels of enforcement, it may choose to 
preemptively publish reports of its discrete enforcement levels, or at least keep 
internal files in anticipation of litigation. An agency may also try to gain a 
better understanding of its own overlapping regulatory schemes and when 
certain issues belong to a unitary scheme. Just as judicial review provides 
external pressure to an agency to consider its reasons for action, so here would 
it incentivize the agency to consider its reasons for inaction. 
Discrete look also beneﬁts Congress. Congress is frequently silent because 
it faces collective action problems and scattered priorities, but its silence 
should not always be understood as aﬃrmative approval of agency inaction.133 
Without further instruction, an agency might exercise discrete 
nonenforcement because it does not really think that Congress mandated it to 
regulate the subset. If litigation causes frequent shifts in resource allocation 
between X, Y, and Z, this can be a strong signal to Congress to provide more 
funding or clarify the agency’s mandate. Indeed, if some enforcement 
priorities become tethered to who happens to have won in court, Congress 
 
132 Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985) (explaining that the presumption against 
judicial review of agency inaction can be overcome when the agency “consciously and expressly 
adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory 
responsibilities” (citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc))). 
133 Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 155 (2000) (“Indeed, this 
is not a case of simple inaction by Congress that purportedly represents its acquiescence in an 
agency’s position.”). 
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may be alerted to conduct a more programmatic assessment about 
enforcement priorities. 
Despite its beneﬁts, one might ask if discrete look is worth the trouble for 
the courts. A judge may think that this rule would be too intrusive a test to 
ask courts to perform. In principle, if courts are already hesitant to ﬁnd 
abdication on the face of a statute, they could be even more reluctant to look 
into the weeds to examine whether an agency is enforcing each discrete 
subset. Courts might think that it is not their job to probe beneath the surface 
of a statute where Congress has not delineated the subject matter in more 
detail in the statute itself. Practically, courts might be concerned about what 
makes a subset discrete. Absent some clear limiting principle, the courts could 
ﬁnd themselves knee-deep in the sort of agency micromanagement that the 
Supreme Court in Chaney wanted the judicial branch to avoid. Three 
responses assuage these concerns. 
First, the unwillingness of circuit courts to find abdication may say less 
about how deferential courts are to agencies and more about how easy it is for 
agencies to satisfy the existing test. It is easy for the agency to maintain a 
barebone level of enforcement at the statutory level. Statutory charges are by 
nature broad, allowing the agency to easily meet a minimum level of 
enforcement. This could possibly account for the enormous difficulty of 
plaintiffs’ ability to get review. Once the court can look to the discrete level, 
however, an agency can no longer rely on the fact that it is still minimally 
enforcing the statute generally. It cannot simply increase enforcement levels in 
any subset it wishes in order to raise its overall enforcement level. The court’s 
analysis becomes more piercing because it looks solely to what an agency has 
done or not done with respect to the discrete subset in question. As a result, 
the point of reference has narrowed. Under discrete look, abdication analysis is 
likely to have stronger teeth because agencies will predictably have gaps within 
their statutory charge that they are not filling at all. 
Second, discrete look only asks a court to probe deeper into an existing 
framework. Courts will still ask if there is some level of enforcement or a 
general nonenforcement policy. However, the inquiry is not limited at the 
statutory level but extends toward the more granular perspective of the 
discrete subset. The status quo under Chaney’s Lines already asks courts to 
see if there is some level of enforcement or a general nonenforcement policy. 
The only further task that discrete look requires courts to perform is 
operationalizing what makes a subset discrete. This involves asking standard-
based questions, which courts are familiar with doing in other contexts. 
Further, analysis at the discrete level is not entirely new to the judiciary. 
While no Line 1 or Line 2 circuit court has performed abdication analysis on 
the discrete level, at least one district court has. In PETA v. USDA, the 
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District Court for the District of Columbia examined whether the USDA was 
abdicating its statutory charge under the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”).134 
The plaintiﬀs sued the USDA for its decade-long refusal to regulate bird 
abuse.135 Had the court followed Line 1, it could have simply concluded that 
the USDA did maintain some level of enforcement against animal abuse 
generally and ended the inquiry there. But the court chose to analyze agency 
nonenforcement as it related speciﬁcally to birds.136 PETA is not a direct 
example of discrete look, however, because birds were speciﬁcally deﬁned as 
one of the animals to be regulated under the AWA, whereas here compounded 
lethal drugs are not speciﬁcally deﬁned as a type of new drug. But the court’s 
exercise of probing deeper—speciﬁcally to birds as opposed to animals in 
general—is still instructive. 
Third, discrete look would not overly burden the courts or agencies with 
lawsuits. Plaintiffs must make certain threshold showings before requiring the 
agency to respond. And even then, the court may still refuse judicial review if 
the agency refutes this showing, persuades the court that the regulatory 
scheme is not unitary, or questions whether the subset truly belongs to the 
whole. These hurdles mean that frivolous cases will not clog the court’s docket 
because they can be disposed of quickly without reaching the stage of arbitrary 
and capricious review. 
As a ﬁnal thought, discrete look is a modest reﬁnement of Chaney 
compared to alternative proposals that would get plaintiﬀs into court. This 
Comment rejects eliminating Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability 
altogether by suggesting, for example, that courts should review agency 
inaction in the same way as agency action.137 That would ﬂood the courts and 
paralyze the agencies in their day-to-day decision-making. This Comment 
also rejects allowing judicial review of all agency inaction with extra deference 
to the agency, as Justice Marshall suggested in his concurrence in Chaney.138 
That would still drown the courts with lawsuits, because courts could not 
dismiss cases at the threshold question of judicial reviewability. 
The problem with these alternative proposals is that they burn the forest 
to get the tree. Discrete look is calculated: it looks at a consistent pattern of 
agency nonenforcement over time or a general nonenforcement policy, rather 
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than every individual instance of nonenforcement. Discrete look is also 
targeted: it focuses on discrete subsets of a statutory charge, recognizing that 
agencies can abdicate their duties by consistently not enforcing a discrete 
subset. That makes litigation more focused and less prone to endless 
discovery. Thus, discrete look preserves the basic policy motivations behind 
Chaney while giving courts power to conduct some form of judicial review. 
This Section described the contribution of discrete look to administrative 
law. Discrete look is a modest rule that benefits various actors in the 
administrative context, and it is the kind of probing that courts are 
competent to perform. 
CONCLUSION 
When death row inmates sue the FDA for its inaction toward 
compounded lethal drugs, the court should grant judicial review. The FDA 
has to make tough calls about its enforcement priorities, but consistently 
choosing not to enforce a discrete subset of new drugs should not be a choice 
that is immune from judicial review. Because Congress set up a framework that 
empowers the FDA to regulate compounded lethal drugs, the agency should not 
be able to refuse to enforce the law without expecting some judicial review. 
There will always be hard cases about what counts as “some” level of 
enforcement, about temporality, and about what makes a subset discrete. But 
hard questions do not eliminate the need for general principles. Discrete look 
does not make the question any harder as it largely adapts the existing case 
law into a more sensible standard. Finally, it suﬃces to say that when the 
FDA has essentially no level of enforcement over a subset that could hardly 
stand out more, this is not a hard case. 
While the death penalty is a controversial issue, botched executions and 
illicit supply chains are not controversial. They are harms that merit regulation, 
or at least judicial review for a lack of regulation. Whatever salience this topic 
has outside the courts, it comes in very standard administrative law terms. Here, 
as in the rest of administrative law, it is still the “province and duty” of the courts 
to remind the agency “what the law is.”139 
 
139 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
